笔记本
从学生到完美的Office Lady——给即将成为OL的女孩们75条建议--转
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-06-22 10:53:59
从学生到完美的Office Lady——给即将成为OL的女孩们75条建议--转
1. 隔离霜一定要从第一天开始上班就涂。整天对着电脑,辐射和灰尘都很厉害,如果想让自己的脸老得慢一些的话,一定要涂隔离霜,最好是有防晒功能的,并且不能太油的。
2. 眼霜有条件的话,就要用起来了。职业的微笑如果总挂在脸上,眼角纹总是会悄悄的提早到来,再加上目不转睛的对着电脑,眼睛周围的细纹会长得很快。
3. 去角质的东西和面膜要用的,这样才能让肌肤有更好的新陈代谢。
4. 一定要注意补水,化妆水一定要保湿的!上学的时候,可能会更喜欢控油的,但是上了班,保湿将成为永恒的主题。晚上睡觉前,也可以用一些补水的爽什么的。
5. 水果水果水果水果水果,多多多多多吃!!!这个一定要坚持啊。一坐一天不动,很容易便秘。如果你午饭总是吃便当,那更要注意了。我就是深受其害。还好在我邻桌的同事熏陶了我,她皮肤相当完美,原因就是水果吃得很多。
6. 水,想起来就要喝,永远保持水杯有水的状态。这个好处多了,不赘述。
7. 办公桌上,可以没有任何东西,但是两样必须要有,一个是护手霜,另外一个是眼药水。这两样东西每天都用得着。
8. 能不对着电脑就不对着电脑,多走动走动,有利于减肥。我刚开始上班的时候,胖了很多,运动少了,压力小了,自然会变胖。所以要防微杜渐。
9. 如果你坐班车,一定要自备一个颈枕。现在的班车,大部分都是按照西方人的体形做的,东方人坐着很难受,尤其是女生。我的肩膀因此而变得很僵硬…希望能引起大家注意。
10. 办公桌抽屉里面永远放一包面巾纸,还有少许卫生巾,外加一把雨伞。
11. 电脑屏幕键盘经常清洁。
12. 多晒太阳,比如吃完午饭可以出去走走。
13. 鞋子一定要舒适为主。即使你很爱美,也要备上一双黑色,穿这可以走很长路的鞋,一定要是纯皮的。
14. 黑色白色衬衣都要各有一件,最好是不张扬,但是有个性的。
15. 丝袜要多弄几双,不容易烂的,贴近肤色的。另外还要有黑色的丝袜,不要有花纹的。
16. 粉底液的颜色,不要和肤色相差太远。
17. 多用唇膏,少用口红,后者会让重金属沉淀,让嘴唇颜色变深。
18. 夏天一定要用防晒霜。
19. 如果你头发到了可以扎起来的长度,最好在手边备一根头绳,说不定什么时候你就需要。
20. 不要以为OL只穿黑白两色。有很多服饰可供选择,我开始的时候,就是把自己打扮得太老气了:(
21. 注意同事换衣服的频率,如果大家一天换一套,你也要——即使不是每天换下来都洗。
22. MSN你有吗?没有赶快弄一个。
23. 上班的路上,可以走路就走路,最好是大步快走,节省时间,也锻炼身体。
24. 工作的时候,时常伸伸懒腰,否则脊椎和肩膀都受不了。
25. 下班之后,可以在床上做作仰卧起坐,或者压压腿什么的,反正多少运动就比不运动好。
26. 如果有免费的咖啡,也不要多喝。
27.关于游泳圈,这是个棘手的问题。如果你会游泳,那最好,每周一次,游上一个小时就可以。如果不会游泳,晚上睡觉之前,做一些简单的运动。在床上平躺,双腿并拢,向上抬起,30度,60度,90度的时候,各停顿10秒;然后再一次放下来。这样来回做上5次。重要的是坚持哦,呵呵。
28.证件照一定要有比较不错的哦,1寸2寸都要多备几张。
29.如果你租房子的话,一定不要从开始的时候就想着住的舒服,否则房租压力会很大。
30.刚开始的收入一般情况下都不会太高,所以,能不买的东西就尽量别买哦,除非是很喜欢的。如果拿自己不太多的工资换不值得的东西,日子就难过喽。买东西前,一定要问问自己:这个是我非买不可的吗?是我最喜欢的吗?如果不是,请不要买。东西买多了,搬家也是麻烦哦。
31.笔记本电脑我是从一开始就用的,但还是辐射很严重呢,隔离霜虽然不防辐射,但多少能阻隔一些灰尘。可以准备电脑刷和屏幕布,时常清洁。
32.电话机也是同理,如果没有阿姨固定时间打扫的话,要自己经常清洁话筒哦。
33.台历要准备一本,平常可以记一些小事情在上面,也便于自己安排日程。
34.如果有班车,把班车路线保存好。
35.如果来不及吃早饭,就在办公室备一些芝麻糊什么的,早上吃了多少填饱肚子。
36.手机到了办公室,最好打成静音,这样有利于保护自己的隐私。只要把手机放到手边就可以了。
37.如果你在外企,一定要做到人走抽屉锁,手提电脑也要上锁。因为说不定什么时候就有安全部门来查看,被查住就惨了。
38.周末没有事情做?就看看人文景观,或者去看看博物馆吧,逛街总是有厌烦的一天。短途旅行感觉很好噢。
39.攒钱买个数码相机吧,趁着年轻多留影。
40.移动硬盘也便宜了,买一个也用得着哦。
41.手机,其实没必要那么赶时髦的,只要用的顺手就可以了。
42.手机套餐要下一番功夫来研究,我自己身有体会,套餐改变之后,费用只有原来的1/2。
43.外出的时候,包包一定要拿好,要警觉一些。一人在外,被偷了,会欲哭无泪的。
44.你戴手表吗?我戴的,其实比起看手机,还是方便一些的。
45.包包里面一定要有面巾纸,便签和笔。
46.自己的信息一定要保存好,比如身份证号码,轻易不要向别人偷漏。
47.如果在外地,一定要适应当地的方言,即使不会说,也要做到能听懂。
48.OL只是小白领哦,呵呵,过得开心一些,别总为了加班费把自己弄得疲惫不堪。
49.没时间买东西?上淘宝吧,可以送到公司前台。不过要挑信誉度高的卖家,最好是好评100%的。
50.注意老板的衣着言行,知道自己怎样做不算太离谱。
51.放弃学生时代的散漫,言必行,行必果,这样才能受欢迎。不要做草莓一族哦:)
52.再忙也要给和自己打招呼的人回应。即使是网络聊天,也要呼应,不要对别人的话不理不睬。
53.如果有多余的钱,想买奢侈品,那就买最有名的香水吧。
54.看到一些非常光鲜的衣服,却担心没机会穿。如果真得很出彩,就买一套吧,公司年会的时候开party可以用得上哦,没准最亮丽的就是你。
55.在意自己的发型,时刻保持精神的状态。
56.不要觉得自己还是小孩子,办公室里大家都是一样的,没有人会因为你是80后而让着你哦。
57.计算机课上面学的办公软件操作,可以时不常拿出来看看。你会发现,原来工作了n多年的同事,对这个地了解,非常有限。
58.如果有机会,比如让你做一个什么主持人啊,让你表演节目啊,一定不要拒绝。要有信心,记住,信心是一点一点积累起来的。多参加这样的活动也能让自己变得更开朗。
59.如果用手提电脑,记得在电脑包里面放上一根网线,匆忙走的时候,也检查一下电源是否带上了。
60.如果离开自己的座位,一定要锁定电脑的屏幕,保护自己的数据和隐私。
61.同事关系再好也是同事,总是有利益关系,一定不要觉得对方不错,就无话不说。
62.别人不情愿教你东西的时候,就要厚着脸皮去问,主动学习。
63.看《南方周末》和《经济观察报》,另外找一份当地的主流小报。
64.看电视,中央10套和第一财经。
65.对于工作用的各种数据库,系统,不要惊慌。看上去繁琐,其实很简单。
66.打印出来的文件要及时拿掉,用不到的文件用碎纸机清理。单面纸再利用。
67.利用好公司的内网。
68.如果办公室的电话很复杂,集中精力把它搞定,否则打电话的时候会很尴尬。
69.对于电话留言,及时察看回复。
70.接电话的时候,无论对什么人,总是一样的态度。
71.利用好n次贴和荧光笔,有效率的工作。
72.犯了错误,及时改正。不要掩饰。
73.尽量不要议论老板的言行,即便你很不理解,老板的高度可能是我们一时不理解的。
74.不要太心急跳槽,一定要明白,自己在这里学到了什么,自己有什么技能可以拿得出手。
75.如果你家在外地,第一次回家的时候,可以是当代一些家乡的小食品回来给同事。
千人力荐技术帖:怎样把你的女儿养的更漂亮
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-04 01:34:37
失去了猫性的女孩子,就代表不再爱了
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 21:55:11
一个女孩上自习,太凉了
她发短信让男朋友去送衣服给她,男孩打游戏拒绝了.
这件事让她郁闷了两天然后气消了,
虽然是件小事,不会影响两人以后, 但是她说,
她会记住, 以后自习一定会带衣服,
如果哪天忘记了, 即使冷,也不再会叫他送.
一个女孩某天夜里,
心情特别低回,特别想念某个人的安慰,
然后半夜时分,打电话给他,说很想听他说话,
电话那头的他从睡梦中醒来,不耐烦的敷衍她.
从此以后,她再没有伤心无助时给他打过电话.
我发现女孩身上有一种猫性.
小猫在撒娇或者做错事的时候,需要别人的安慰和教导,
如果这时主人打击了它,它会狠狠记住,不会再犯.
女孩,有着猫一样的自尊.特别是陷入爱情里的女孩...
在别人看来无关紧要,其实需要呵护,
因为爱,已经让她的心变得柔软.
她的这一点自尊,其实是要你对她的在乎.
我看过一句特别经典的话,
有时候女孩需要一个男孩,就像逃机者需要降落伞,
如果此时此刻他不在,那么以后他也不必在了.
真的,就是这样.是啊是啊,
如果哪天猫咪用坚定的眼神看着你说我可以的时候,
那么猫咪已经做好了离开的准备了!
女孩是要独立,
但是独立到不再会对你不讲道理的撒娇任性,
不再会无厘头的缠着你,
你觉得你对于她同路人还有多大区别呢?
女孩的猫性不是每个男孩都有幸看到的,
因为喜欢你,在意你才对你发出特有的咕噜噜声,
其他人只能听到猫喵喵叫,
而这一声咕噜噜只是为你而生,
有几个人会明白呢??
我们爱折腾
只是爱折腾他而已。
如果有一天
我们慢慢发现自己可以一个人玩都不觉得闷
很久不捏他也不会手痒
只是静静的待在他旁边
不再想着法儿去玩它
谁能知道那时的我们该有多难过呢
男孩总会说女孩无理取闹
说女孩没事找事
说女孩不讲道理
说女孩不可理喻
为什么不去想想
她在对待别人的时候
为什么不是这样的态度
没错
如果有一天
她不再对你撒娇
她不再对你任性
她不再缠着你跟你要这个要那个
她不再因为你的任何事情微笑或者皱眉
那么
你就永远的失去她了
我们暧昧,却不属于对方
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 21:12:39
暧昧是,你会常常在QQ等他在线。当他几天没有在线,你就会有些担心。
暧昧是,你会不时去他的BLOG看看有没有更新;而且你会留意字里行间,他对你有没有什么暗示。
暧昧是,有感觉,然而,这种感觉不足以叫你们切切实实地发展一段正式的关系。
暧昧是,明白人生有太多的无奈,现实有太多的限制。你知道没有可能,但又舍不得放手。
暧昧是,有进一步的冲动,却没有进一步的勇气。
暧昧是,他不是你的情人,但似乎他比你的情人更关心你和了解你。
暧昧是,你会编一条围巾给他,但大家从没有开始过。
暧昧是,虽然他不是你的情人,但他却会对你说:你对我是十分重要的。
暧昧是,你感冒时有一个会在晚上打电话来,特意提醒你服药,叫你盖好被子早点睡的普通朋友。
暧昧是,当你遇到问题解决不了的时候,你找不到你的男/女朋友,你第一个便会想起他。
暧昧是,每当他提及他的另一半时,你会万箭穿心。
暧昧是,为了逃避背叛的罪恶感。
暧昧是,甜津津又同时酸溜溜的。往往从未开始,已叫人不安,患得患失。
暧昧是,别人以为你们在搞地下情时,你会沾沾自喜。
暧昧是,别人问你们是否恋爱中,你张口结舌。
暧昧是,常常挣扎表不表白。你怕表白之后,你既得不到一个情人,却又失去了一个知心好友。
暧昧是,见到他,你会心跳。见不到他时,你会挂念他。
暧昧是,两个人都会互相猜想。他是不是已经暗示了什么?我是不是自作多情?
暧昧是,每天大家都会聊QQ,会互传手机短讯,无规律地偶然约会。
暧昧是,除了情人节之外,其它的节日,大家都交换礼物。
暧昧是,你很想多走一步,但又怕会吓怕了他。你会很小心流露自己的感情。
暧昧是,两个人没有承诺过什么。但虽然如此,你愿意付出的,比有承诺的情侣更多。没有责任,但你却很渴望去承担,不问回报。
暧昧,是一扇门,你可以停留在门外,也可以踏进房子里面。然后你不可以停留在门下面。门--永不是终点站。
“我们暧昧,我们却不属于对方。”!!!!
结婚的意义
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 21:10:56
---几米之漫画

从某一刻开始,我无比想要结婚。 若问我结婚的意义,其实,
我只是想要一个温暖的熊熊,可以治疗我的体寒症;
我只是想要一个可爱的微笑,可以肆意与我互相宠爱;
我只是想要一份势均力敌的感情,
可以云淡风轻、细水长流……
昨天一个同事说,她要结婚了,因为要赶着两个人一起早一点买房子;
不久前,朋友说,想结婚,因为想要一个孩子,生活实在没有趣味;
还听到过不止一个人这样说,对方条件还不错,就结婚吧……

很多结婚的理由,可是不知道为什么都是这样勉强的理由,
让人听不出感情中喜乐悲哀的成分。
我仿佛已经很久很久都没有听到有一个人说,
他要结婚是因为很爱很爱一个人,因为想和另一个人永远的在一起。
也许永远实在太远,
也许人生真的无法十全十美

曾经在书上看到一位香港的女作家写的一段话:
“我们是不是已处在一个鸡肋世纪?生活上有着太多食而无味、弃之可惜的人
情与事物。上至婚姻、事业,下至中午时分匆匆吃下肚的那个盒饭,都可能是鸡肋。”
读这段文字的时候可以感觉到一种不见眼泪的悲伤和一种不见血肉的折磨,生
活仿佛总在营造着一个又一个缺陷。
有一天我碰上一个高中时候的女友,我知道很长一段时间以来她都在不停的相亲,
可是一直都没有遇到满意的。
我于是问她,是不是要求太高了?是不是要那种高学历,高收入,高身材的?
因为熟,所以我的语气中明显带着一些调侃。
她笑笑说:不是啊!她对这些倒不是太看重,其实相亲是目的性很强的,
就是奔着结婚的,但是她就是没有那种感觉。
我知道这种只要感觉的人,是相亲者中最难成功的。
就忍不住逼问她到底要怎样的结婚的感觉?

“我只是希望在我不开心的时候,他可以让我觉得他会一直陪在我身边,
即使不安慰什么,只是抱着我,紧些,紧些,再紧些,
说,他会一直很爱我。”
她的表情坚定,没有一丝玩笑的神情。
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
我忽然觉得有一点感动,像是在这个连月光都无法穿透的城市里看到了一线温情的光。

我想我不一定要求对方一定要让我感觉到切切的相思,苦苦的守候,
或者绵绵的爱恋,我的婚姻也只需云淡风轻,细水长流。
但是有一天当他向我求婚时,不是因为婚姻能带给他多少实际的利益,
而是因为婚姻在他生活中的那份意义。
我希望在那一刻他可以给我一个理由,告诉我他想和我相守,
一起度过生命中的每一次喜怒悲欢,
一起相守到老。
即使只是在那一刻……
word诀窍
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 21:00:29
把文字替换成图片
首先把图片复制到 剪贴板中,然后打开替换对话框,在“查找内容”框中输入将被替换的文字,接着在“替换为”框中输入“^c”(注意:输入的一定要是半角字符,c要小写),单击替换 即可。说明:“^c”的意思就是指令WordXP以剪贴板中的内容替换“查找内容”框中的内 容。按此原理,“^c”还可替换包括回车符在内的任何可以复制到剪贴板的可视内容,甚至Excel表格。
三招去掉页眉那条横线
1、在页眉中,在“格式”-“边框和底纹”中设置表格和边框为“无”,应用于“段落”
2、同上,只是把边框的颜色设置为白色(其实并没有删的,只是看起来没有了,呵呵)
3、在“样式”栏里把“页眉”换成“正文”就行了——强烈推荐!
会多出--(两个横杠) 这是用户不愿看到的,又要多出一步作删除--
解决方法:替换时在前引号前加上一个空格 问题就解决了
插入日期和时间的快捷键
Alt+Shift+D:当前日期
Alt+Shift+T:当前时间
批量转换全角字符为半角字符
首先全选。然后“格式”→“更改大小写”,在对话框中先选中“半角”,确定即可
Word启动参数简介
单击“开始→运行”命令,然后输入Word所在路径及参数确定即可运行,如“C:\ PROGRAM FILES \MICROSOFT Office \Office 10\ WINWord.EXE /n”,这些常用的参数及功能如下:
/n:启动Word后不创建新的文件。
/a:禁止插件和通用模板自动启动。
/m:禁止自动执行的宏。
/w:启动一个新Word进程,独立与正在运行的Word进程。
/c:启动Word,然后调用Netmeeting。
/q:不显示启动画面。
另外对于常需用到的参数,我们可以在Word的快捷图标上单击鼠标右键,然后在“目标”项的路径后加上该参数即可。
快速打开最后编辑的文档
如果你希望Word在启动时能自动打开你上次编辑的文档,可以用简单的宏命令来完成:
(1)选择“工具”菜单中的“宏”菜单项,单击“录制新宏”命令打开“录制宏”对话框;
(2)在“录制宏”对话框中,在“宏名”输入框中输入“autoexec”,点击“确定”;
(3)从菜单中选择“文件”,点击最近打开文件列表中显示的第一个文件名;并“停止录制”。保存退出。下次再启动Word时,它会自动加载你工作的最后一个文档。
格式刷的使用
1、设定好文本1的格式。
2、将光标放在文本1处。
3、单击格式刷按钮。
4、选定其它文字(文本2),则文本2的格式与文本1 一样。
若在第3步中单击改为双击,则格式刷可无限次使用,直到再次单击格式刷(或按Esc键)为止。
删除网上下载资料的换行符(象这种“↓”)
在查找框内输入半角^l(是英文状态下的小写L不是数字1),在替换框内不输任何内容,单击全部替换,就把大量换行符删掉啦。
选择性删除文件菜单下的最近使用的文件快捷方式。
工具→选项→常规把“列出最近使用文件数改为0”可以全部删除,若要选择性删除,可以按ctrl+Alt+ -三个键,光标变为一个粗减号后,单击文件,再单击要删除的快捷方式就行了。
建立一个矩形选区:
一般的选区建立可用鼠标左键,或用shift键配合pgup、pgdn、home、end、箭头等功能键,当复制一个规则的矩形区域时,可先按住Alt键,然后用鼠标左键来选。我一般用此来删除段首多余的成块的空格。大家试一试*^_^*
将字体快速改为上标或下标的方法:
本人在一次无意间发现了这个方法,选定你要下标的字,然后在英文状态下按住Ctrl,再按一下BASKSPACE旁的+/=的键,就可以了。上标只要在按Ctrl的同时也按住Shift,大家可以试试。
让Word表格快速一分为二
将光标定位在分开的表格某个位置上,按下“Ctrl+Shift+Enter”组合键。这时你就会发现表格中间自动插入一个空行,这样就达到了将一个表格一分为二的目的。
用Word来拆字
首先点击“工具/自定义/命令/分解图片”,按住鼠标左键把它拖放到工具栏任意位置即可;然后点击“插入/图片/艺术字”,例如输入空心字“心”,选择该“心”字剪切,在选择性粘贴中选图片(Windows图元文件),选中该字,点击工具栏中的“分解图片”按钮,这样可以选择“心”中的任意笔画进行一笔一画的拆分了。
快速删除段前段后的任意多个空格
选定这些段段落,单击居中按钮,然后再单击原来的那种对齐方式按钮(如果原来是居中对齐的,先单击其它对齐方式按钮,再单击居中按钮就行了),是不是这些空格全不见了?
只要打开WORD新建一个空文档的时候,出现的不是空的文档,而是我以前打的一份文档
首先:将资源管理器设置为显示所有文件和文件夹;
然后:
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Microsoft\Templates文件夹下将所有Normal.doc文件删掉;
然后:OK(XP系统)
快速输入平方的方法
先输入2,然后选重后,按ctrl加shift加+就可以了.
WORD中表格的选择性录入
1.设置好表格,选定表格-视图-工具-窗体-插入下拉型窗体域
2.输入数据,完成
3.点击锁按钮,保护,输入完后再点击进行其它的输入.
标点符号的全角/半的转换用:Ctrl+.
数字字母的全角/半的转换用:Shift+空格
轻松了解工具栏按钮的作用
按下“shift+F1”键,鼠标指针旁多了一个“?”号,想知道哪个按钮
的作用,就用鼠标单击哪个。
要经常在文档中插入自己公司的信息
公司名称
公司住址
联系电话
联系人姓名
QQ号码
可以先选定这些内容,再单击工具→自动更正→在替换框中输入标记名称(如“公司信息”)→添加→确定,以后凡是在文档中要用到这个信息的地方键入“公司信息”(不要引号)这几个字后就自动替换成:
公司名称
公司住址
联系电话
联系人姓名
QQ号码
说明:有些输入法不支持这个功能,键入标记名称后要按一下空格才行。
快速换页的方法
双击某页的右下脚,光标即可定位在那里,然后按回车直到换页。ctrl+回车点插入按纽,分隔符,选中分页符,然后确认就OK了 !!!
表格的简单调整宽度
鼠标放在表格的右边框上带鼠标变成可以调整大小的时候
双击
根据表格内的内容调节表格大小
代替金山词霸
点工具——语言——翻译,在右边出现的搜索框中输入要查的单词,回车就可以翻译了。可以选择英语翻成中文或中文翻成英语。
第一次使用可能要安装。
[Alt]键实现标尺的精确定位
如果你经常使用水平标尺来精确定位标签、页边框、首字缩进及页面对象的位置,那么你点击标尺设置页边框或标签时,您只可以将其设置为1字符或2字符,但不能设为1.5字符!要想设置更为精确的度量单位(例如百分之几字符),在按住[Alt]键的同时,点击并移动标尺或边框,此时标尺将用数字精确显示出当前的位置为百分之几字符位置。
用“记事本”去除格式(哇!!!!!这招我常常用的)
网页上COPY下来的东西往往都是有网格的,如果直接粘贴在WORD中会杂乱无章。先粘贴到记事本当中,再粘贴到WORD中,就可以去除网格等格式,再全选选择清除格式,居中再取消居中即可取消所有格式。可以直接在WORD中进行:(菜单)编辑/选择性粘贴……/无格式文本/确定。这样省事多了。
快速将文档转换成图片
先把欲想转换的文档保存退出.如:保存在桌面
然后新建一个文件.把想转换的文档(鼠标左建按住该文档不放)直接施放在页面上
恢复office的默认设置
比如不小心把word设置乱了(如删了菜单栏等等).
查找normal.dot直接删除.
下一次启动word会恢复默认值.
让Word只粘贴网页中的文字而自动去除图形和版式
方法一、选中需要的网页内容并按“Ctrl+C”键复制,打开Word,选择菜单“编辑”→“选择性粘贴”,在出现的对话框中选择“无格式文本”。
方法二、选中需要的网页内容并按“Ctrl+C” 键复制,打开记事本等纯文本编辑工具,按“Ctrl+V”键将内容粘贴到这些文本编辑器中,然后再复制并粘贴到Word中。
ctrl+alt+f可以输入脚注
这个对于经常写论文的朋友应该有点帮助。
将阿拉伯数字转换成中文数字或序号
1、先输入阿拉伯数字(如1234),全选中,单击“插入/数字/数字类型(壹、贰……)/确定”,即变为大写数字(如壹仟贰佰叁拾肆),会计朋友非常适用。
2、其他像一千二百三十四,甲、乙……,子、丑……,罗马数字等的转换,可参考上法。
Word中的常用快捷键吧
“字体”对话框 Ctrl+D
选择框式工具栏中的“字体”框 Ctrl+Shift+F
加粗 Ctrl+B
倾斜 Ctrl+I
下划线Ctrl+U
“上标”效果 Ctrl+Shift+=
“下标”效果 Ctrl+=
“关闭”命令 Ctrl+W
Word快捷键一览表
序号 快捷键CTRL+ 代表意义
1…………Z…………撤消
2…………A…………全选
3…………X…………剪切
4…………C…………复制
5…………V…………粘贴
6…………S…………保存
7…………B…………加粗
8………… Q…………左对齐
9…………E…………据中
10…………R…………右对齐
11…………]…………放大
22…………[…………缩小
12…………N…………新建文档
13…………I…………字体倾斜
14…………W…………退出
15…………P…………打印
16…………U…………下划线
17…………O…………打开
18…………k…………插入超级连接
19…………F…………查找
20…………H…………替换
21…………G…………定位
23…Ctrl+Alt+L……带括号的编号
24…Ctrl+Alt+.________…
25…Alt+数字………区位码输入
26…Ctrl+Alt+Del………关机
27…Ctrl+Alt+Shift+?……?
28…Ctrl+Alt+Shift+!……?
29…Alt+Ctrl+E……………?
30…Alt+Ctrl+R……………?
31…Alt+Ctrl+T……………?
32…Alt+Ctrl+Ctrl…………?
33……Ctrl+D……………格式字体
34……Ctrl+Shift+= ………上标
35……Ctrl+=………………下标
36……Ctrl+Shift+>……放大字体
37……Ctrl+Shift+< ……缩小字体
38……Alt+Ctrl+I………打印预览
39……Alt+Ctrl+O………大刚示图
40……Alt+Ctrl+P………普通示图
41……Alt+Ctrl+M………插入批注
42……Alt+菜单上字母………打开该菜单
无级微调
打开“绘图”工具栏-点开下拉菜单-绘图网格...-将水平间距和垂直间距调到最小0.01-确定,这样你就可以无级微调
把work设置成在线打开,但不能修改‘只读’怎搞啊?
文件夹共享为只读
在WORD中输入三个等号然后回车。。。出来的是双横线哦。。。
同样的方法也可以做出波浪线单横线哦!~~~~~ ,
###为中间粗上下细的三线, ***为点线, ~~~为波浪线, ---为单线
输入拼音字母的音调怎么输入
用智能ABC,键入v9,然后自己挑选吧!
页码设置
1、打开页眉/页脚视图,点击插入页码按钮,将页码插入(此时所有的页码是连续编号的) 2、切换到页面视图,在需要从1计数的页面上插入连续分节符(插入--分隔符--分节符--连续) 3、再次换到页眉/页脚视图,点击设置页码格式按钮,将页码编排-起始页码设置为1
把Excel中的表格以图片形式复制到Word中
除了用抓图软件和全屏拷贝法外还有更简单的呢
先选定区域,按住Shift健点击"编辑"会出现"复制图片""粘贴图片",复制了后,在Word中选"粘贴图片"就可像处理图片一样处理Excel表格了!
Ctrl+鼠标滑轮(左右键中间的那个轮子)可以迅速调节显示比例的大小(100%)。向上滑扩大,向下滑缩小。
快速调整页眉横线长度
在word插入页眉后,会自动在此位置添加一条长横线。如果需要调整此线的长度及其水平位置,可以首先激活页眉,选择格式下的段落命令,调整一下左右缩进的字符值,确定可以看到最终效果了!
快速浏览图片
在WORD2003中,如果插入的图片过多,会影响打开和翻滚的速度。其实,我们可以通过改变图片的显示方式改变浏览速度。
工具--选项--视图--图片框
这样,先显示的是图片框,需要看的时候,停留,即可显示!
WORD 中如何输入分数
1、打开word,点击工具菜单栏的“插入”,在下拉菜单中点“域”。
2、在打开的复选框中的类别栏中“选等式公式”,域名中“EQ”。然后点击“选项”,在出现的菜单选项中选“F(,)”,接着点击“添加到域”并“确定”。
3、然后在输入F(,)数字,如要输入23 只需在F(,)输入F(2,3)就能得到2/3
怎样使WORD 文档只有第一页没有页眉,页脚
答:页面设置-页眉和页脚,选首页不同,然后选中首页页眉中的小箭头,格式-边框和底纹,选择无,这个只要在“视图”——“页眉页脚”,其中的页面设置里,不要整个文档,就可以看到一个“同前”的标志,不选,前后的设置情况就不同了
Word中双击鼠标的妙用
在Word的程序窗口中不同位置上双击,可以快速实现一些常用功能,我们归纳如下:
在标题栏或垂直滚动条下端空白区域双击,则窗口在最大化和原来状态之间切换;
将鼠标在标题栏最左边WORD文档标记符号处双击,则直接退出WORD(如果没有保存,会弹出提示保存对话框);
将鼠标移到垂直滚动条的上端成双向拖拉箭头时双击,则快速将文档窗口一分为二;
将鼠标移到两个窗口的分界线处成双向拖拉箭头时双击,则取消对窗口的拆分;
在状态栏上的“修订”上双击,则启动“修订”功能,并打开“审阅”工具栏。再次双击,则关闭该功能,但“审阅”工具栏不会被关闭;
在状态栏上的“改写”上双击,则转换为“改写”形式(再次“双击”,转换为“插入”形式);
如果文档添加了页眉(页脚),将鼠标移到页眉(页脚)处双击,则激活页眉(页脚)进入编辑状态,对其进行编辑;在空白文档处双击,则启动“即点即输”功能;
在标尺前端空白处双击,则启动“页面设置”对话框。
在word编辑中经常要调整字休大小来满足编辑要求
选中要修改的文字,按ctrl+]或ctrl+[来改变字体的大小!
这个方法可以微量改字体大小~
文本框的线条
1. 制作好文档后,通过“视图→页眉页脚”命令,调出“页眉页脚”工具栏,单击其中的“显示→隐藏文档正文文字”按钮,隐藏正文部分的文字内容。
2. 选择“插入”菜单中的“文本框”命令,在页眉的下方插入一个空文本框。
3. 在文本框内加入作为水印的文字、图形等内容,右击图片,选择快捷菜单中的“设置图片格式”命令,在对话框中“图片”选项卡下,通过“图像控制”改变图像的颜色,对比度和亮度,并手动调整图片的大小。
4. 通过“设置文本框格式”命令,把文本框的线条色改为无线条色。
5. 单击“页眉页脚”工具栏的“关闭”按钮,退出“页眉页脚”编辑。
每页添加水印的操作
1. 制作好文档后,通过“视图→页眉页脚”命令,调出“页眉页脚”工具栏,单击其中的“显示→隐藏文档正文文字”按钮,隐藏正文部分的文字内容。
2. 选择“插入”菜单中的“文本框”命令,在页眉的下方插入一个空文本框。
3. 在文本框内加入作为水印的文字、图形等内容,右击图片,选择快捷菜单中的“设置图片格式”命令,在对话框中“图片”选项卡下,通过“图像控制”改变图像的颜色,对比度和亮度,并手动调整图片的大小。
4. 通过“设置文本框格式”命令,把文本框的线条色改为无线条色。
5. 单击“页眉页脚”工具栏的“关闭”按钮,退出“页眉页脚”编辑。
6. 完成上述步骤的操作,水印制作得以完成,这样就为每一页都添加了相同的水印。
让Word页面快速一分为二
将光标定位在想分开的位置上,按下“Ctrl+Shift+Enter”组合键。
使Word中的字体变清晰
Word文档中使用 “仿宋” 字体很淡,可按以下方法使字体更清晰:
右击桌面,点 “属性”,点 “外观”,点 “效果”,选中“使用下列方式使屏幕字体的边缘平滑”选“清晰”,确定。
Word双面打印技巧
我们平时用电脑的时候可能都少不了打印材料,Word是我们平常用的最多的Office软件之一。有时我们要用Word打印许多页的文档,出于格式要求或为了节省纸张,会进行双面打印。
我们一般常用的操作方法是:选择“打印”对话框底部的“打印”下拉列表框中的“打印奇数页”或“打印偶数页”,来实现双面打印。我们设定为先打印奇数页。等奇数页打印结束后,将原先已打印好的纸反过来重新放到打印机上,选择该设置的“打印偶数页”,单击“确定”按钮。这样通过两次打印命令就可以实现双面打印。
我们也可以利用另一种更灵活的双面打印方式:打开“打印”对话框,选中“人工双面打印”,确定后就会出现一个“请将出纸器中已打印好的一面的纸取出并将其放回到送纸器中,然后‘确定’按键,继续打印”的对话框并开始打印奇数页,打完后将原先已打印好的纸反过来重新放到打印机上,然后按下该对话框的“确定”按键,Word就会自动再打印偶数页,这样只用一次打印命令就可以了。
两种方法对比,后者较前者更为方便。
爱你,不告诉你
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 20:51:25

密雪笼罩著山谷。狂风一吹,便腾起团团烟雾。在这罕无人迹的雪山上,铺天盖地的雪浪轰击著一切。
两个人在山路上艰难地移动著。他们都是户外运动爱好者,相约进山,途中意外碰到暴风雪,迷了路。
在此之前,他们仅仅只是要好的同事,虽然从接触中感受到了彼此的爱慕,但从未表白过。这次旅行是男人蓄意已久的,小心翼翼地说给女人,果然一拍即合。
雪越下越大,每走一步,都要付出相当大的力气。他们手拉著手,在没膝的雪中艰难前进。衣服已经湿透了,冷风一吹,两个人都冻得嘴唇青紫。
已经三天了,他们仍找不到出去的路。体力严重透支,最糟糕的是,食物也越来越少了。男人把所有的食物都集中到了女人的背包里,由女人规划,控制每天的食量。
路过一片树林时,女人掉进雪洞里,扭伤了脚。男人已经极度疲惫,不可能背上女人前进。斟酌再三,只能由男人独自前行,找到出山的路,寻求救援。
男人为女人架起了帐篷,安顿好。
女人告诉男人:“还剩下八块压缩饼干,我们一人四块。”随后叮嘱男人出去烧水。男人烧好水送进帐篷来,女人说饼干分好了,装在两个人的包里。男人摸了摸,凭感觉,的确是一样多。他拉著女人的手,说:“等著我,我马上回来。”
直到这时,他们仍然没有向对方表达自己的爱恋。这种情况下,可能一分手就是永别。如果,他们中只有一人能生存,那何必让对方用一生的时间,去忘记一个逝去的爱人呢?
男人替女人拉上睡袋,转身。
男人每走一段路,都做下记号。他一心想著找到救援,回去接女人。男人渐渐支撑不住了,终于,他耗尽了最后一丝力气倒下了。失去知觉前,他想,女人的食物还够吗?还能撑住吗?
醒来后,男人发现自己躺在救援队的帐篷里。朋友知道他们一起进山,一连几天没有回来,猜想他们遇到了险情。为了找到他们,救援队已经进山搜救很久了。他们先找到女人的帐篷,然后顺著男人留下的记号,找到奄奄一息的男人。
男人的体温渐渐恢复,醒后第一句话就问:“她呢?”大家不语。
男人一呆,挣扎著要去找她。
救援队长低声说:“她不在了,可能是出去融雪烧水,没力气回到帐篷,冻死了。”
三年后,男人结婚了,是一个和女人一样喜欢户外运动的可爱女孩。女人走后,这个女孩陪男人走过了最难过的日子,男人逐渐快乐起来。
当年的救援队长参加了他的婚礼。
婚礼后,队长来到女人的墓地,女人在照片上,笑容依旧美丽。队长对女人说:“你放心吧,他结婚了,很幸福。”
女人不是冻死的,救援队发现她的时候,她好好地躺在帐篷里,睡袋盖得很好,男人替她盖好的,她舍不得动。
女人是饿死的,她的背包里只有几块平平的石板,根本不是什么压缩饼干。他们当时仅有的压缩饼干,不是八块,而是四块。女人把仅有的食物都留给了男人,她骗过了他,因为,她真的,很爱他。
队长发现女人的时候,她早已经僵硬的手中,紧紧攥著一张小纸条:“我肯定撑不到他回来了。别告诉他,他该有自己的生活。”
正确的恋爱方式——来自心理学家
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 17:56:13
爱的反面不应该是恨,而应该是淡忘;那为什么有些人的爱会变成恨,而不能成为淡忘呢,那是因为他在爱里面,缺乏了自信......
在恋爱中我们需要完成两项重要的心理任务:一、要更了解自己。除自我认知概念外,让两性恋爱中的自己更完整清晰地呈现出来。 二、培养我们爱人的能力。从自小习惯被爱开始学会爱人。
看一个男人是不是好男人有三个基准:负责、尊重和稳定。负责意味着他能对自己所说过的话负责。尊重则是指,他能够尊重自己的另一半,就是我们通常所说的,你和他之间建立的是“伙伴式关系”,你们相处的方式是平等的。另外,他还要是一个情绪稳定的人。有些人情绪容易大起大落,这样的人是很难维持一段长久的关系的。
上面说的只是好男人的基准。如果我们把条件再抬高成精品男人的话,还可以归纳出所谓“三心二意”的基准。首先第一个心是开心。他自己应该是一个开朗的人,这会让和他一起相处的人也感到心情愉快。第二个心是关心。关心意味着体贴,这是所有女生都很容易理解的。第三个心是同理心。什么叫同理心?就是设身处地为别人着想的能力。同理心是尊重的来源,也是情侣间解决冲突时最重要的能力。还有两意。第一个意是诚意。诚意意味着真诚,真诚又是负责的基础。第二个意是善意,就是要能够用善意的方式去解读情侣的行为。这是很多人在与情侣相处时很难做到的,比如对方不小心迟到时,用恶意的解读方式来理解,就会开始责怪对方,你不在乎我!
有人买了一只不停亏损的股票,就像面对一段无法挽救的婚姻,该不该抛出就跟是否应该离婚一样困扰着他。在事情上所花出去所有的成本,比如耗费的时间、金钱等,当这些成本无法回收时,在心理学上被成为沉默成本。为什么我们不愿意离开一个不健康的婚姻,为什么不愿意放弃一个没有价值的股票,原因是我们不愿意去承认这些沉默成本再也无法回收。
男生在恋爱里的情绪需求有如下几点:一、自身的能力被肯定。他时常会关心是否有让人瞧得起?二、才华被欣赏。也许他有些嗜好和才华与其工作完全不干,但你仍需学会喜爱和尊重。三、努力被感激。他对你以及对这段感情所做的努力需要被感激。
女生在恋爱里的情绪需求:一、时常被关怀。虽是日常的唠叨,请你耐心倾听。二、再三地被肯定。她可能一二再而三地询问你是否爱她。其实她只是需要再三地肯定,你需要给她信心。三、想法被尊重。(在分享情绪种种时增进彼此感情)
保持爱情天长地久的方式:制定一个三乘三的保鲜计划。一天三次一次三分钟。三A计划,第一Attention,全神贯注。在我们日常生活中,我常认为我们能给别人最好的礼物是时间,放掉你手边的所有活,关掉手机专心地听对方说话。第二Affection,浓情蜜意。非口语的沟通,即肢体语言的沟通。没事多抱抱对方。第三Appreciation,相互欣赏。
每一个成熟的女性身体里都有个非常幼稚的小女孩,每一个幼稚小女孩体内都有个幼稚的小问号。那就是我到底有没有讨人喜欢。在这个时候你需要学会称赞对方,当然称赞对方外貌、身材是个不错的选择。或者她照顾家庭的能力也是不可忽视的。
当然每一个成熟的男性身体里都有个非常幼稚的小男孩,每一个幼稚的小男孩体内都有个可笑的小问号,那就是我有没有让人家瞧不起?不管变成多成熟的男性,这个小问号依然存在。学会给他肯定,从来没有什么事情比爱更动容。如果现在觉得生命中有一些不完整的地方,很可能就是这个功课还没有做完。
爱情其实有规律可寻,如果遵循这些心理情绪需求,当最后一次对对方说我爱你的时候,我们会了无遗憾。对逝去的人最好的纪念方式是继承她的品质继续好好地生活下去
2010 80后奔三挥别青春祭言
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 17:47:12
10年前听刘德华的歌,老师说我很前卫;10年后再听刘德华的歌,学妹说,哦,原来学哥这么怀旧?刘德华是谁?楼下邻居小妹问我。
10年前津津有味地看偶像剧,逢插播广告,连忙换台或者上厕所;10年后津津有味地看各种广告,逢到偶像剧,连忙换台或者上厕所。
10年前我以为孩子是一个奇迹;10年后我知道母亲才是一个奇迹。
10年前我认为我需要很多人的爱;10年后我知道很多人需要我的爱。
10年以别人总是对我很愤怒,就好像我一直是个不良少年一样;10年后我总是对别人很愤怒,就好像我一直是个良好少年一样。
10年前我对一个女孩子说:“我爱你。”她说:“对不起,我们还小。”;10年后我对一个女孩子说:“我爱你。”她说:“对不起,我还小。”
……
——这是80后奔三的一段真情告白。
读来伤感中透出一股回肠荡气。
是的,在过几天,80后整整一代人,将从2010年起,集体奔三。不管你是否愿意抑或如何扭住青春,人类前进的步伐,就是这么干净利落整齐划一。
三十而立,让人热血迸发,让人唏嘘感慨。
面对90后的异军突起,80后是否还有理由说自己很年轻?
如果说50后和60后是一个国家的基石,70后已成脊梁,不再青春的80后在人类历史进程中将是怎样一个角色?
是的,他们曾经迷茫,曾经惶恐,曾经失败,曾经被社会误读“垮掉了”。然而,一夜之间,当他们如潮水般出现在“5•12”汶川特大地震紧急救援大军行列时,人们突然发现:我们曾经忧虑的80后长大成熟了——
那些从前在人们眼中靠互联网搜索引擎感知世界、酒吧喝小酒靠内心生活的一代人,如今已变成孝顺的子女,值得依靠的伴侣,爱怜子女的父母……
这就是奔三途中的80后——
他们多是独根苗或独生女,没有兄弟姐妹,是父母的“掌中宝”;面对父母双鬓渐白,身体各个零部件开始老化,家庭概念超越了爱情和友情,一切都将家庭放在第一位。没有了原本的冲动,了解了父母的苦心,懂得去体谅他们的无可奈何。原本单纯的家庭之间关系,在某一天突然变得清晰,了解了人与人之间的关系,原来一直都不那么单纯,最值得相信的,除了父母,还有自己。
他们有过几次痛彻心扉的恋爱,虽然仍然相信爱情存在,但不再渴望那份浪漫而刺激的爱情,而是奢望一段幸福而美满的婚姻。他们已经不把婚姻当成爱情的升华,而是把婚姻当作是亲情。他们曾经固执地以为,相亲那只不过是70后,或者说更早一代的婚姻方式,然而等到现在才发现,相亲已经成为了80后婚姻的主流方式。一场场地相亲,一次次的绝望,已经对相亲产生了麻木和排斥,但依然奔波在相亲场上:“我不是在相亲,就是在相亲的路上。”
在之前,他们依赖互联网,离开网络不知道怎么过;他们控音乐控电影控封面,控到自己都觉得得了强迫症,但有一天突然发现,手机使用的频率越来越少,短信也越来越少,有时甚至不愿意发短信,宁可打个电话,匆匆挂掉。QQ也不像以前那样拼命地闪个不停,退出了许多群,有些群碍于面子,一直处于潜水,只是偶尔选择几个群浮出水面换口气顺便冒几个泡泡表示自己还存在。他们再也不会为了CS、魔兽废寝忘食,更多的时候会捧着一本书,安静地看着。
他们发现朋友越来越少,却越老越好;他们终于成为或即将成为别人的另一半,信誓旦旦承诺给对方一生幸福,其实内心忐忑;他们开始已经明白,人都要慢慢变老,于是坦然接受皮肤松弛和鱼尾纹;他们讨厌父母的教育方式,如今却如法炮制不折不扣用来对付自己的小孩;他们或许有一份稳定的收入,可薪水老是跟不上房价攀升的速度;他们行走在路上,没有机会喘歇;他们懂得享受,知道珍惜,拒绝庸俗;他们有自己的坚持,从未放弃努力;他们有各自不同的压力,并慢慢将它们变成动力;他们肩上抗着责任的担子,勇于担当不怕失败……
……
现在,家园建设的接力棒已传入他们手中。他们已经或正在成为中国前进的基调,贴着“动力人群”的标签,大步向中国走来。
80后30岁的男人更加成熟睿智。
80后30岁的女人更加美丽知性。
以此作祭:2010年,80后集体奔三。
几米12星座
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2010-01-01 17:45:48
白羊座 "天要暗了,最后一道夕阳的馀光即将消逝。那场球赛,我们一败涂地,大家垂头丧气地默默离开。我们还是做出胜利的手势吧!多年以后,谁会记住那场令人沮丧的球赛呢?只会看见相片里我们灿烂的笑容。":
金牛座 "遇见一个人要一秒钟的时间,认识一个人要一分钟的时间,喜欢一个人要一小时的时间,爱上一个人要一天的时间,忘记一个人却要用一辈子的时间。":
双子座 "一样的眼睛有不一样的看法。一样的耳朵有不一样的听法。一样的嘴巴有不一样的说法。一样的心有不一样的想法。是不是因为这样,一样的人生才有不一样的哀愁。":
巨蟹座 "总在快乐的时候,感到微微的惶恐。在开怀大笑时,流下感动的泪水。我无法相信单纯的幸福。对人生的期负悲喜,既坦然又不安。":
狮子座 "以为有了翅膀,就会变成一只鸟,以为变成鸟之后,就可以拥有自由,而今,拥有了期盼的翅膀,却只能在小小的空间里,飞翔,遗失了自由,原来自己还是搞不懂,是想要翅膀,飞翔,或是自由,还是只要一种追求飞翔的感觉。":
处女座 在我最接近月亮的那一天,月亮跟我说了一个秘密,他说其实她是太阳;在我最接近月亮的那一天,我跟月亮说了一个秘密,我说其实我很怕高。在自己面前应该一直留有一个地方,然后去爱。不知道是谁,不知道如何去爱,也不知道可以爱多久。只是等待一次爱情,也许永远都没:
天秤座 "窗外放晴了,屋内仍继续下雨。我微笑,并不等于我快乐。我撑伞,并非只是为了避雨。你永远都不懂我在想什么。我想拥抱每个人,但我得先温暖我自己,请容忍我。因为我已在练习容忍你。":
天蝎座 "摘不到的星星,总是最闪亮的。溜掉的小鱼,总是最美丽的。错过的电影,总是最好看的。失去的情人,总是最懂我的。我始终不明白,这究竟是什么道理。":
射手座 "所有的悲伤,总会留下一丝欢乐的线索。所有的遗憾,总会留下一处完美的角落。我在冰封的深海,找寻希望的缺口。却在午夜惊醒时,蓦然瞥见绝美的月光。":
摩羯座 "颁奖的音乐响起时,我觉得好尴尬。第一名的人,兴奋过头,休克送医院急救,无法领奖。第二名的人,不服气了,拒绝领奖。第四名的人,因为不是前三名,没脸领奖。第五名的人说:'第四名的人都不领奖了,我也不好意思领奖'。第三名的人真寂寞。":
水瓶座 "人不是鱼,怎会了解鱼的忧愁。鱼不是鸟,怎会了解鸟的快乐。鸟不是人,怎会了解人的荒唐。人不是鸟,怎会了解鸟的自由。鸟不是鱼,怎会了解鱼的深沉。鱼不是人,怎会了解人的幼稚。你不是我,怎会了解我。":
双鱼座 "肚子饿了,开始吃饭,吃得饱饱,开始想你,觉得困了,开始睡觉,睁开眼睛,开始想你,夜幕低垂的那一刻,其实什么事情也没有发生……":
The Path of the Law——Oliver Wendell Holmes
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2009-07-09 15:23:35
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When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well-known profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.
The means of the study are a body of reports, of treatises, and of statutes, in this country and in England, extending back for six hundred years, and now increasing annually by hundreds. In these sibylline leaves are gathered the scattered prophecies of the past upon the cases in which the axe will fall. These are what properly have been called the oracles of the law. Far the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophecies more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system. The process is one, from a lawyer's statement of a case, eliminating as it does all the dramatic elements with which his client's story has clothed it, and retaining only the facts of legal import, up to the final analyses and abstract universals of theoretic jurisprudence. The reason why a lawyer does not mention that his client wore a white hat when he made a contract, while Mrs. Quickly would be sure to dwell upon it along with the parcel gilt goblet and the sea-coal fire, is that he foresees that the public force will act in the same way whatever his client had upon his head. It is to make the prophecies easier to be remembered and to be understood that the teachings of the decisions of the past are put into general propositions and gathered into textbooks, or that statutes are passed in a general form. The primary rights and duties with which jurisprudence busies itself again are nothing but prophecies. One of the many evil effects of the confusion between legal and moral ideas, about which I shall have something to say in a moment, is that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse, and consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added afterward. But, as I shall try to show, a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so of a legal right. The number of our predictions when generalized and reduced to a system is not unmanageably large. They present themselves as a finite body of dogma which may be mastered within a reasonable time. It is a great mistake to be frightened by the ever-increasing number of reports. The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty much the whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view. We could reconstruct the corpus from them if all that went before were burned. The use of the earlier reports is mainly historical, a use about which I shall have something to say before I have finished. I wish, if I can, to lay down some first principles for the study of this body of dogma or systematized prediction which we call the law, for men who want to use it as the instrument of their business to enable them to prophesy in their turn, and, as bearing upon the study, I wish to point out an ideal which as yet our law has not attained. The first thing for a businesslike understanding of the matter is to understand its limits, and therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and dispel a confusion between morality and law, which sometimes rises to the height of conscious theory, and more often and indeed constantly is making trouble in detail without reaching the point of consciousness. You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can. I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to say as the language of cynicism. The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law. For that purpose you must definitely master its specific marks, and it is for that that I ask you for the moment to imagine yourselves indifferent to other and greater things. I do not say that there is not a wider point of view from which the distinction between law and morals becomes of secondary or no importance, as all mathematical distinctions vanish in presence of the infinite. But I do say that that distinction is of the first importance for the object which we are here to consider — a right study and mastery of the law as a business with well understood limits, a body of dogma enclosed within definite lines. I have just shown the practical reason for saying so. If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. The theoretical importance of the distinction is no less, if you would reason on your subject aright. The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before our minds. The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and negligence, and so forth, and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense, at some state of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy. For instance, when we speak of the rights of man in a moral sense, we mean to mark the limits of interference with individual freedom which we think are prescribed by conscience, or by our ideal, however reached. Yet it is certain that many laws have been enforced in the past, and it is likely that some are enforced now, which are condemned by the most enlightened opinion of the time, or which at all events pass the limit of interference, as many consciences would draw it. Manifestly, therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law. No doubt simple and extreme cases can be put of imaginable laws which the statute-making power would not dare to enact, even in the absence of written constitutional prohibitions, because the community would rise in rebellion and fight; and this gives some plausibility to the proposition that the law, if not a part of morality, is limited by it. But this limit of power is not coextensive with any system of morals. For the most part it falls far within the lines of any such system, and in some cases may extend beyond them, for reasons drawn from the habits of a particular people at a particular time. I once heard the late Professor Agassiz say that a German population would rise if you added two cents to the price of a glass of beer. A statute in such a case would be empty words, not because it was wrong, but because it could not be enforced. No one will deny that wrong statutes can be and are enforced, and we would not all agree as to which were the wrong ones. The confusion with which I am dealing besets confessedly legal conceptions. Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you that it is something different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of this mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law. Take again a notion which as popularly understood is the widest conception which the law contains — the notion of legal duty, to which already I have referred. We fill the word with all the content which we draw from morals. But what does it mean to a bad man? Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money. But from his point of view, what is the difference between being fined and taxed a certain sum for doing a certain thing? That his point of view is the test of legal principles is proven by the many discussions which have arisen in the courts on the very question whether a given statutory liability is a penalty or a tax. On the answer to this question depends the decision whether conduct is legally wrong or right, and also whether a man is under compulsion or free. Leaving the criminal law on one side, what is the difference between the liability under the mill acts or statutes authorizing a taking by eminent domain and the liability for what we call a wrongful conversion of property where restoration is out of the question. In both cases the party taking another man's property has to pay its fair value as assessed by a jury, and no more. What significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong from the point of view of the law? It does not matter, so far as the given consequence, the compulsory payment, is concerned, whether the act to which it is attached is described in terms of praise or in terms of blame, or whether the law purports to prohibit it or to allow it. If it matters at all, still speaking from the bad man's point of view, it must be because in one case and not in the other some further disadvantages, or at least some further consequences, are attached to the act by law. The only other disadvantages thus attached to it which I ever have been able to think of are to be found in two somewhat insignificant legal doctrines, both of which might be abolished without much disturbance. One is, that a contract to do a prohibited act is unlawful, and the other, that, if one of two or more joint wrongdoers has to pay all the damages, he cannot recover contribution from his fellows. And that I believe is all. You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at the same time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and expel everything except the object of our study, the operations of the law. Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of contract. Among other things, here again the so-called primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it — and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can. It was good enough for Lord Coke, however, and here, as in many others cases, I am content to abide with him. In Bromage v. Genning, a prohibition was sought in the Kings' Bench against a suit in the marches of Wales for the specific performance of a covenant to grant a lease, and Coke said that it would subvert the intention of the covenantor, since he intends it to be at his election either to lose the damages or to make the lease. Sergeant Harra for the plaintiff confessed that he moved the matter against his conscience, and a prohibition was granted. This goes further than we should go now, but it shows what I venture to say has been the common law point of view from the beginning, although Mr. Harriman, in his very able little book upon Contracts has been misled, as I humbly think, to a different conclusion. I have spoken only of the common law, because there are some cases in which a logical justification can be found for speaking of civil liabilities as imposing duties in an intelligible sense. These are the relatively few in which equity will grant an injunction, and will enforce it by putting the defendant in prison or otherwise punishing him unless he complies with the order of the court. But I hardly think it advisable to shape general theory from the exception, and I think it would be better to cease troubling ourselves about primary rights and sanctions altogether, than to describe our prophecies concerning the liabilities commonly imposed by the law in those inappropriate terms. I mentioned, as other examples of the use by the law of words drawn from morals, malice, intent, and negligence. It is enough to take malice as it is used in the law of civil liability for wrongs what we lawyers call the law of torts — to show that it means something different in law from what it means in morals, and also to show how the difference has been obscured by giving to principles which have little or nothing to do with each other the same name. Three hundred years ago a parson preached a sermon and told a story out of Fox's Book of Martyrs of a man who had assisted at the torture of one of the saints, and afterward died, suffering compensatory inward torment. It happened that Fox was wrong. The man was alive and chanced to hear the sermon, and thereupon he sued the parson. Chief Justice Wray instructed the jury that the defendant was not liable, because the story was told innocently, without malice. He took malice in the moral sense, as importing a malevolent motive. But nowadays no one doubts that a man may be liable, without any malevolent motive at all, for false statements manifestly calculated to inflict temporal damage. In stating the case in pleading, we still should call the defendant's conduct malicious; but, in my opinion at least, the word means nothing about motives, or even about the defendant's attitude toward the future, but only signifies that the tendency of his conduct under known circumstances was very plainly to cause the plaintiff temporal harm. In the law of contract the use of moral phraseology led to equal confusion, as I have shown in part already, but only in part. Morals deal with the actual internal state of the individual's mind, what he actually intends. From the time of the Romans down to now, this mode of dealing has affected the language of the law as to contract, and the language used has reacted upon the thought. We talk about a contract as a meeting of the minds of the parties, and thence it is inferred in various cases that there is no contract because their minds have not met; that is, because they have intended different things or because one party has not known of the assent of the other. Yet nothing is more certain than that parties may be bound by a contract to things which neither of them intended, and when one does not know of the other's assent. Suppose a contract is executed in due form and in writing to deliver a lecture, mentioning no time. One of the parties thinks that the promise will be construed to mean at once, within a week. The other thinks that it means when he is ready. The court says that it means within a reasonable time. The parties are bound by the contract as it is interpreted by the court, yet neither of them meant what the court declares that they have said. In my opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs — not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing. Furthermore, as the signs may be addressed to one sense or another — to sight or to hearing — on the nature of the sign will depend the moment when the contract is made. If the sign is tangible, for instance, a letter, the contract is made when the letter of acceptance is delivered. If it is necessary that the minds of the parties meet, there will be no contract until the acceptance can be read; none, for example, if the acceptance be snatched from the hand of the offerer by a third person. This is not the time to work out a theory in detail, or to answer many obvious doubts and questions which are suggested by these general views. I know of none which are not easy to answer, but what I am trying to do now is only by a series of hints to throw some light on the narrow path of legal doctrine, and upon two pitfalls which, as it seems to me, lie perilously near to it. Of the first of these I have said enough. I hope that my illustrations have shown the danger, both to speculation and to practice, of confounding morality with law, and the trap which legal language lays for us on that side of our way. For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much in the clearness of our thought. So much for the limits of the law. The next thing which I wish to consider is what are the forces which determine its content and its growth. You may assume, with Hobbes and Bentham and Austin, that all law emanates from the sovereign, even when the first human beings to enunciate it are the judges, or you may think that law is the voice of the Zeitgeist, or what you like. It is all one to my present purpose. Even if every decision required the sanction of an emperor with despotic power and a whimsical turn of mind, we should be interested none the less, still with a view to prediction, in discovering some order, some rational explanation, and some principle of growth for the rules which he laid down. In every system there are such explanations and principles to be found. It is with regard to them that a second fallacy comes in, which I think it important to expose. The fallacy to which I refer is the notion that the only force at work in the development of the law is logic. In the broadest sense, indeed, that notion would be true. The postulate on which we think about the universe is that there is a fixed quantitative relation between every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents. If there is such a thing as a phenomenon without these fixed quantitative relations, it is a miracle. It is outside the law of cause and effect, and as such transcends our power of thought, or at least is something to or from which we cannot reason. The condition of our thinking about the universe is that it is capable of being thought about rationally, or, in other words, that every part of it is effect and cause in the same sense in which those parts are with which we are most familiar. So in the broadest sense it is true that the law is a logical development, like everything else. The danger of which I speak is not the admission that the principles governing other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct. This is the natural error of the schools, but it is not confined to them. I once heard a very eminent judge say that he never let a decision go until he was absolutely sure that it was right. So judicial dissent often is blamed, as if it meant simply that one side or the other were not doing their sums right, and if they would take more trouble, agreement inevitably would come. This mode of thinking is entirely natural. The training of lawyers is a training in logic. The processes of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do not exist for the determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place. We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind. No concrete proposition is self evident, no matter how ready we may be to accept it, not even Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Every man has a right to do what he wills, provided he interferes not with a like right on the part of his neighbors." |
Indeed, I think that even now our theory upon this matter is open to reconsideration, although I am not prepared to say how I should decide if a reconsideration were proposed. Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like, where the damages might be taken to lie where they fell by legal judgment. But the torts with which our courts are kept busy today are mainly the incidents of certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or property by railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public. The public really pays the damages, and the question of liability, if pressed far enough, is really a question how far it is desirable that the public should insure the safety of one whose work it uses. It might be said that in such cases the chance of a jury finding for the defendant is merely a chance, once in a while rather arbitrarily interrupting the regular course of recovery, most likely in the case of an unusually conscientious plaintiff, and therefore better done away with. On the other hand, the economic value even of a life to the community can be estimated, and no recovery, it may be said, ought to go beyond that amount. It is conceivable that some day in certain cases we may find ourselves imitating, on a higher plane, the tariff for life and limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum.
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I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious, as I have said. When socialism first began to be talked about, the comfortable classes of the community were a good deal frightened. I suspect that this fear has influenced judicial action both here and in England, yet it is certain that it is not a conscious factor in the decisions to which I refer. I think that something similar has led people who no longer hope to control the legislatures to look to the courts as expounders of the constitutions, and that in some courts new principles have been discovered outside the bodies of those instruments, which may be generalized into acceptance of the economic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years ago, and a wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyers does not think about right. I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and see that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions.
So much for the fallacy of logical form. Now let us consider the present condition of the law as a subject for study, and the ideal toward which it tends. We still are far from the point of view which I desire to see reached. No one has reached it or can reach it as yet. We are only at the beginning of a philosophical reaction, and of a reconsideration of the worth of doctrines which for the most part still are taken for granted without any deliberate, conscious, and systematic questioning of their grounds. The development of our law has gone on for nearly a thousand years, like the development of a plant, each generation taking the inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous growth. It is perfectly natural and right that it should have been so. Imitation is a necessity of human nature, as has been illustrated by a remarkable French writer, M. Tard, in an admirable book, Les Lois de l'Imitation. Most of the things we do, we do for no better reason than that our fathers have done them or that our neighbors do them, and the same is true of a larger part than we suspect of what we think. The reason is a good one, because our short life gives us no time for a better, but it is not the best. It does not follow, because we all are compelled to take on faith at second hand most of the rules on which we base our action and our thought, that each of us may not try to set some corner of his world in the order of reason, or that all of us collectively should not aspire to carry reason as far as it will go throughout the whole domain. In regard to the law, it is true, no doubt, that an evolutionist will hesitate to affirm universal validity for his social ideals, or for the principles which he thinks should be embodied in legislation. He is content if he can prove them best for here and now. He may be ready to admit that he knows nothing about an absolute best in the cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing about a permanent best for men. Still it is true that a body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words. At present, in very many cases, if we want to know why a rule of law has taken its particular shape, and more or less if we want to know why it exists at all, we go to tradition. We follow it into the Year Books, and perhaps beyond them to the customs of the Salian Franks, and somewhere in the past, in the German forests, in the needs of Norman kings, in the assumptions of a dominant class, in the absence of generalized ideas, we find out the practical motive for what now best is justified by the mere fact of its acceptance and that men are accustomed to it. The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened scepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal. For the rational study of the law the blackletter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. I am thinking of the technical rule as to trespass ab initio, as it is called, which I attempted to explain in a recent Massachusetts case. Let me take an illustration, which can be stated in a few words, to show how the social end which is aimed at by a rule of law is obscured and only partially attained in consequence of the fact that the rule owes its form to a gradual historical development, instead of being reshaped as a whole, with conscious articulate reference to the end in view. We think it desirable to prevent one man's property being misappropriated by another, and so we make larceny a crime. The evil is the same whether the misappropriation is made by a man into whose hands the owner has put the property, or by one who wrongfully takes it away. But primitive law in its weakness did not get much beyond an effort to prevent violence, and very naturally made a wrongful taking, a trespass, part of its definition of the crime. In modem times the judges enlarged the definition a little by holding that, if the wrong-doer gets possession by a trick or device, the crime is committed. This really was giving up the requirement of trespass, and it would have been more logical, as well as truer to the present object of the law, to abandon the requirement altogether. That, however, would have seemed too bold, and was left to statute. Statutes were passed making embezzlement a crime. But the force of tradition caused the crime of embezzlement to be regarded as so far distinct from larceny that to this day, in some jurisdictions at least, a slip corner is kept open for thieves to contend, if indicted for larceny, that they should have been indicted for embezzlement, and if indicted for embezzlement, that they should have been indicted for larceny, and to escape on that ground. Far more fundamental questions still await a better answer than that we do as our fathers have done. What have we better than a blind guess to show that the criminal law in its present form does more good than harm? I do not stop to refer to the effect which it has had in degrading prisoners and in plunging them further into crime, or to the question whether fine and imprisonment do not fall more heavily on a criminal's wife and children than on himself. I have in mind more far-reaching questions. Does punishment deter? Do we deal with criminals on proper principles? A modern school of Continental criminalists plumes itself on the formula, first suggested, it is said, by Gall, that we must consider the criminal rather than the crime. The formula does not carry us very far, but the inquiries which have been started look toward an answer of my questions based on science for the first time. If the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as deep seated an organic necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to talk of deterring him by the classical method of imprisonment. He must be got rid of; he cannot be improved, or frightened out of his structural reaction. If, on the other hand, crime, like normal human conduct, is mainly a matter of imitation, punishment fairly may be expected to help to keep it out of fashion. The study of criminals has been thought by some well known men of science to sustain the former hypothesis. The statistics of the relative increase of crime in crowded places like large cities, where example has the greatest chance to work, and in less populated parts, where the contagion spreads more slowly, have been used with great force in favor of the latter view. But there is weighty authority for the belief that, however this may be, "not the nature of the crime, but the dangerousness of the criminal, constitutes the only reasonable legal criterion to guide the inevitable social reaction against the criminal." The impediments to rational generalization, which I illustrated from the law of larceny, are shown in the other branches of the law, as well as in that of crime. Take the law of tort or civil liability for damages apart from contract and the like. Is there any general theory of such liability, or are the cases in which it exists simply to be enumerated, and to be explained each on its special ground, as is easy to believe from the fact that the right of action for certain well known classes of wrongs like trespass or slander has its special history for each class? I think that the law regards the infliction of temporal damage by a responsible person as actionable, if under the circumstances known to him the danger of his act is manifest according to common experience, or according to his own experience if it is more than common, except in cases where upon special grounds of policy the law refuses to protect the plaintiff or grants a privilege to the defendant. I think that commonly malice, intent, and negligence mean only that the danger was manifest to a greater or less degree, under the circumstances known to the actor, although in some cases of privilege malice may mean an actual malevolent motive, and such a motive may take away a permission knowingly to inflict harm, which otherwise would be granted on this or that ground of dominant public good. But when I stated my view to a very eminent English judge the other day, he said, "You are discussing what the law ought to be; as the law is, you must show a right. A man is not liable for negligence unless he is subject to a duty." If our difference was more than a difference in words, or with regard to the proportion between the exceptions and the rule, then, in his opinion, liability for an act cannot be referred to the manifest tendency of the act to cause temporal damage in general as a sufficient explanation, but must be referred to the special nature of the damage, or must be derived from some special circumstances outside of the tendency of the act, for which no generalized explanation exists. I think that such a view is wrong, but it is familiar, and I dare say generally is accepted in England. Everywhere the basis of principle is tradition, to such an extent that we even are in danger of making the role of history more important than it is. The other day Professor Ames wrote a learned article to show, among other things, that the common law did not recognize the defence of fraud in actions upon specialties, and the moral might seem to be that the personal character of that defence is due to its equitable origin. But if, as I said, all contracts are formal, the difference is not merely historical, but theoretic, between defects of form which prevent a contract from being made, and mistaken motives which manifestly could not be considered in any system that we should call rational except against one who was privy to those motives. It is not confined to specialties, but is of universal application. I ought to add that I do not suppose that Mr. Ames would disagree with what I suggest. However, if we consider the law of contract, we find it full of history. The distinctions between debt, covenant, and assumpsit are merely historical. The classification of certain obligations to pay money, imposed by the law irrespective of any bargain as quasi contracts, is merely historical. The doctrine of consideration is merely historical. The effect given to a seal is to be explained by history alone. Consideration is a mere form. Is it a useful form? If so, why should it not be required in all contracts? A seal is a mere form, and is vanishing in the scroll and in enactments that a consideration must be given, seal or no seal. Why should any merely historical distinction be allowed to affect the rights and obligations of business men? Since I wrote this discourse I have come on a very good example of the way in which tradition not only overrides rational policy, but overrides it after first having been misunderstood and having been given a new and broader scope than it had when it had a meaning. It is the settled law of England that a material alteration of a written contract by a party avoids it as against him. The doctrine is contrary to the general tendency of the law. We do not tell a jury that if a man ever has lied in one particular he is to be presumed to lie in all. Even if a man has tried to defraud, it seems no sufficient reason for preventing him from proving the truth. Objections of like nature in general go to the weight, not to the admissibility, of evidence. Moreover, this rule is irrespective of fraud, and is not confined to evidence. It is not merely that you cannot use the writing, but that the contract is at an end. What does this mean? The existence of a written contract depends on the fact that the offerer and offeree have interchanged their written expressions, not on the continued existence of those expressions. But in the case of a bond, the primitive notion was different. The contract was inseparable from the parchment. If a stranger destroyed it, or tore off the seal, or altered it, the obligee could not recover, however free from fault, because the defendant's contract, that is, the actual tangible bond which he had sealed, could not be produced in the form in which it bound him. About a hundred years ago Lord Kenyon undertook to use his reason on the tradition, as he sometimes did to the detriment of the law, and, not understanding it, said he could see no reason why what was true of a bond should not be true of other contracts. His decision happened to be right, as it concerned a promissory note, where again the common law regarded the contract as inseparable from the paper on which it was written, but the reasoning was general, and soon was extended to other written contracts, and various absurd and unreal grounds of policy were invented to account for the enlarged rule. I trust that no one will understand me to be speaking with disrespect of the law, because I criticise it so freely. I venerate the law, and especially our system of law, as one of the vastest products of the human mind. No one knows better than I do the countless number of great intellects that have spent themselves in making some addition or improvement, the greatest of which is trifling when compared with the mighty whole. It has the final title to respect that it exists, that it is not a Hegelian dream, but a part of the lives of men. But one may criticise even what one reveres. Law is the business to which my life is devoted, and I should show less than devotion if I did not do what in me lies to improve it, and, when I perceive what seems to me the ideal of its future, if I hesitated to point it out and to press toward it with all my heart. Perhaps I have said enough to show the part which the study of history necessarily plays in the intelligent study of the law as it is today. In the teaching of this school and at Cambridge it is in no danger of being undervalued. Mr. Bigelow here and Mr. Ames and Mr. Thayer there have made important contributions which will not be forgotten, and in England the recent history of early English law by Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr. Maitland has lent the subject an almost deceptive charm. We must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism, and must remember that for our purposes our only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the present. I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them. As a step toward that ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics. The present divorce between the schools of political economy and law seems to me an evidence of how much progress in philosophical study still remains to be made. In the present state of political economy, indeed, we come again upon history on a larger scale, but there we are called on to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, and the cost. We learn that for everything we have we give up something else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect. There is another study which sometimes is undervalued by the practical minded, for which I wish to say a good word, although I think a good deal of pretty poor stuff goes under that name. I mean the study of what is called jurisprudence. Jurisprudence, as I look at it, is simply law in its most generalized part. Every effort to reduce a case to a rule is an effort of jurisprudence, although the name as used in English is confined to the broadest rules and most fundamental conceptions. One mark of a great lawyer is that he sees the application of the broadest rules. There is a story of a Vermont justice of the peace before whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another for breaking a churn. The justice took time to consider, and then said that he has looked through the statutes and could find nothing about churns, and gave judgment for the defendant. The same state of mind is shown in all our common digests and textbooks. Applications of rudimentary rules of contract or tort are tucked away under the head of Railroads or Telegraphs or go to swell treatises on historical subdivisions, such as Shipping or Equity, or are gathered under an arbitrary title which is thought likely to appeal to the practical mind, such as Mercantile Law. If a man goes into law it pays to be a master of it, and to be a master of it means to look straight through all the dramatic incidents and to discern the true basis for prophecy. Therefore, it is well to have an accurate notion of what you mean by law, by a right, by a duty, by malice, intent, and negligence, by ownership, by possession, and so forth. I have in my mind cases in which the highest courts seem to me to have floundered because they had no clear ideas on some of these themes. I have illustrated their importance already. If a further illustration is wished, it may be found by reading the Appendix to Sir James Stephen's Criminal Law on the subject of possession, and then turning to Pollock and Wright's enlightened book. Sir James Stephen is not the only writer whose attempts to analyze legal ideas have been confused by striving for a useless quintessence of all systems, instead of an accurate anatomy of one. The trouble with Austin was that he did not know enough English law. But still it is a practical advantage to master Austin, and his predecessors, Hobbes and Bentham, and his worthy successors, Holland and Pollock. Sir Frederick Pollock's recent little book is touched with the felicity which marks all his works, and is wholly free from the perverting influence of Roman models. The advice of the elders to young men is very apt to be as unreal as a list of the hundred best books. At least in my day I had my share of such counsels, and high among the unrealities I place the recommendation to study the Roman law. I assume that such advice means more than collecting a few Latin maxims with which to ornament the discourse — the purpose for which Lord Coke recommended Bracton. If that is all that is wanted, the title De Regulis Juris Antiqui can be read in an hour. I assume that, if it is well to study the Roman Law, it is well to study it as a working system. That means mastering a set of technicalities more difficult and less understood than our own, and studying another course of history by which even more than our own the Roman law must explained. If any one doubts me, let him read Keller's Der Romische Civil Process und die Actionen, a treatise on the praetor's edict, Muirhead's most interesting Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome, and, to give him the best chance, Sohn's admirable Institutes. No. The way to gain a liberal view of your subject is not to read something else, but to get to the bottom of the subject itself. The means of doing that are, in the first place, to follow the existing body of dogma into its highest generalizations by the help of jurisprudence; next, to discover from history how it has come to be what it is; and finally, so far as you can, to consider the ends which the several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether they are worth the price. We have too little theory in the law rather than too much, especially on this final branch of study. When I was speaking of history, I mentioned larceny as an example to show how the law suffered from not having embodied in a clear form a rule which will accomplish its manifest purpose. In that case the trouble was due to the survival of forms coming from a time when a more limited purpose was entertained. Let me now give an example to show the practical importance, for the decision of actual cases, of understanding the reasons of the law, by taking an example from rules which, so far as I know, never have been explained or theorized about in any adequate way. I refer to statutes of limitation and the law of prescription. The end of such rules is obvious, but what is the justification for depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time? Sometimes the loss of evidence is referred to, but that is a secondary matter. Sometimes the desirability of peace, but why is peace more desirable after twenty years than before? It is increasingly likely to come without the aid of legislation. Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example. Now if this is all that can be said about it, you probably will decide a case I am going to put, for the plaintiff; if you take the view which I shall suggest, you possibly will decide it for the defendant. A man is sued for trespass upon land, and justifies under a right of way. He proves that he has used the way openly and adversely for twenty years, but it turns out that the plaintiff had granted a license to a person whom he reasonably supposed to be the defendant's agent, although not so in fact, and therefore had assumed that the use of the way was permissive, in which case no right would be gained. Has the defendant gained a right or not? If his gaining it stands on the fault and neglect of the landowner in the ordinary sense, as seems commonly to be supposed, there has been no such neglect, and the right of way has not been acquired. But if I were the defendant's counsel, I should suggest that the foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser. Sir Henry Maine has made it fashionable to connect the archaic notion of property with prescription. But the connection is further back than the first recorded history. It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man. It is only by way of reply to the suggestion that you are disappointing the former owner, that you refer to his neglect having allowed the gradual dissociation between himself and what he claims, and the gradual association of it with another. If he knows that another is doing acts which on their face show that he is on the way toward establishing such an association, I should argue that in justice to that other he was bound at his peril to find out whether the other was acting under his permission, to see that he was warned, and, if necessary, stopped. I have been speaking about the study of the law, and I have said next to nothing about what commonly is talked about in that connection — textbooks and the case system, and all the machinery with which a student comes most immediately in contact. Nor shall I say anything about them. Theory is my subject, not practical details. The modes of teaching have been improved since my time, no doubt, but ability and industry will master the raw material with any mode. Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a house. The most important improvements of the last twenty-five years are improvements in theory. It is not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the subject. For the incompetent, it sometimes is true, as has been said, that an interest in general ideas means an absence of particular knowledge. I remember in army days reading of a youth who, being examined for the lowest grade and being asked a question about squadron drill, answered that he never had considered the evolutions of less than ten thousand men. But the weak and foolish must be left to their folly. The danger is that the able and practical minded should look with indifference or distrust upon ideas the connection of which with their business is remote. I heard a story, the other day, of a man who had a valet to whom he paid high wages, subject to deduction for faults. One of his deductions was, "For lack of imagination, five dollars." The lack is not confined to valets. The object of ambition, power, generally presents itself nowadays in the form of money alone. Money is the most immediate form, and is a proper object of desire. "The fortune," said Rachel, "is the measure of intelligence." That is a good text to waken people out of a fool's paradise. But, as Hegel says, "It is in the end not the appetite, but the opinion, which has to be satisfied." To an imagination of any scope the most far-reaching form of power is not money, it is the command of ideas. If you want great examples, read Mr. Leslie Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, and see how a hundred years after his death the abstract speculations of Descartes had become a practical force controlling the conduct of men. Read the works of the great German jurists, and see how much more the world is governed today by Kant than by Bonaparte. We cannot all be Descartes or Kant, but we all want happiness. And happiness, I am sure from having known many successful men, cannot be won simply by being counsel for great corporations and having an income of fifty thousand dollars. An intellect great enough to win the prize needs other food besides success. The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law。 |
那个人,在哪里
三叶苜蓿 发表于 2009-05-12 16:52:13
选择适合过一辈子的人
心理学家认为,判断男女两个人是否适合“牵手”,应考虑以下10个因素。
第一、彼此都是对方的好朋友,不带任何条件,喜欢与对方在一起。
第二、彼此很容易沟通、互相可以很敞开地坦白任何事情,而不必担心被对方怀疑或轻视。
第三、两人在心灵上有共同的理念和价值观,并且对这些观念有清楚的认识与追求。
第四、双方都认为婚姻是一辈子的事,而且双方(特别强调“双方”)都坚定地愿意委身在这个长期的婚姻关系中。
第五、当发生冲突或争执的时候可以一起来解决,而不是等以后来发作。
第六、相处可以彼此逗趣,常有欢笑,在生活中许多方面都会以幽默相待。
第七、彼此非常了解,并且接纳对方,当知道对方了解了自己的优点和缺点后,仍然确信被他所接纳。
第八、从最了解你、也是你最信任的对方处得到支持的肯定。
第九、有时会有浪漫的感情,但绝大多数的时候,你们的相处是非常满足而且是自由自在的。
第十、有一个非常理性和成熟的交往,并且双方都能感受到,在许多不同的层面上你们是很相配的。
爱情最常见的形式就是两性之间的捕捉与追逐。人际间的好感可以相互传达出强大的力量,以至于能够弥补客观条件的不足。是相似性而非互补性把人们结合到了一起。相似性主要包括三个方面的匹配度:价值观与人格、兴趣和经验、人际风格。其中,人际风格是最重要的关系预测指标。与和自己人际沟通风格有所差异的人交往会有挫折感,且较少有进一步发展的可能。
爱情是追到手的吗?
不是。真正的感情根本不需要追的。两个人的默契,在慢慢将两颗心的距离缩短,在无意识中渐渐靠近彼此。从好朋友到情人,真正的感情是用不了多久的。从你喜欢上他的那一刻起,也许他也在那一刻喜欢上了你。同节奏的爱情往往能奏出最和谐最动听的乐章。
真正的爱情需要什么?需要两个人在一起是轻松快乐的,没有压力。
爱一个人就是毫无保留地付出吗?
不是。每一个人都是一个独立的人,我们首先是属于自己的,我们有思想,我们有个性,而不是把我们的全部都给对方。我们可以有保留,比如你不愿意说的隐私,有秘密的人才是成熟的,不是吗?有时候不说出来反而更好。
外貌和个性哪个更重要?
男人年轻的时候往往喜欢漂亮的女子,25岁以后,会选择和自己性格合适的女子,能和自己一起过日子的人。
不要因为自己长相不如对方而放弃追求的打算,长相只是一时的印象,真正决定能否结合主要取决于双方的性格。我见过的帅哥配丑女,美女配丑男的太多了。
喜欢一个人,太急切了,反而不好。一是因为越想得到的越得不到;二是得到了也很难珍惜,来得快去得也快。细水长流一些,爱情会更长久。
恋爱的时间能长尽量长。这最少有两点好处:一,充分、尽可能长的享受恋爱的愉悦,二,两人相处时间越长,越能检验彼此是否真心,越能看出两人性格是否合得来。
相爱容易相处难。相处中最重要的是宽容和妥协,在信任和了解的基础上。没有宽容和妥协,任何两个人都无法相处。
纯纯的爱也许只有一次,但是真爱未必只有一次。时间会抚平一切伤痕。
我们其实是可以爱上很多人的。我们不是喜欢某个人,而是喜欢某种类型的人。先来的人和我们相遇了,于是我们幸福地走到了一起;对于后到的人,只能抱以歉意,同时,祝福他早日找到属于他自己的幸福。
没有谁是我们一生非拥有不可的,爱一个人,很多时候实际上是习惯了这个人
现实和浪漫哪个更重要?
现实。没有现实为基础,浪漫就是空中楼阁。大学校园的爱情往往随着毕业而告终,大多是因为不现实,不在一个城市。 只有相互欣赏相互佩服各有所长的人,才会碰撞出最美丽的火花,也才会结出最甜美的爱情果实。
分手后我们还可以做朋友吗?
最好不要。剪不断,理还乱。过去了就过去了,我们不是生活在过去,而是现在。爱情不等于生活,只是生活的一部分。
想知道一个人爱不爱你,就看他和你在一起有没有活力,开不开心,有就是爱,没有就是不爱。
爱情不是感动。你不是他心目中的理想伴侣,即使一时接受你,将来碰上他心仪的那一位,一样会离开你。有些人情绪容易大起大落,这样的人是很难维持一段长久的关系的。
浪漫是什么?
是送花?雨中漫步?楼前伫立不去?如果两人彼此倾心相爱,什么事都不做,静静相对都会感觉是浪漫的。否则,即使两人坐到月亮上拍拖,也是感觉不到浪漫的。
是否门当户对不要紧,最重要应该是兴当趣对,不然没有共同语言,即使在一起,仍然会感觉到孤独。
持久的爱情源于彼此发自内心的真爱,建立在平等的基础之上。任何只顾疯狂爱人而不顾自己有否被爱,或是只顾享受被爱而不知真心爱人的人都不会有好的结局。
爱情既是风险投资,难免有去无回,失恋是再正常不过的事情。爱过,就够了。既然不能在一起,总有不能在一起的理由。不能因为别人负了你,就不负责任地游戏、报复或是堕落,自己演的戏,总要自己收场的。何况,他不爱你,你做什么他都不会在乎。
如果爱上,就不要轻易放过机会。莽撞,可能使你后悔一阵子;怯懦,却可能使你一辈子后悔。没有经历过爱情的人生是不完整的,没有经历过痛苦的爱情是不深刻的。爱情使人生丰富,痛苦使爱情升华。
你可能习惯与现在的恋人,明明不太喜欢,但在一起久了,习惯使人不太愿做新的选择。人生会面临无数次选择。当给你机会选择时,你一定要谨慎;一旦你做出了选择,就永远不要后悔;拿得起,放得下,该断则断,该忘记的,就把它忘记;该珍惜的,就要把它珍惜
我们总说:“我要找一个很爱很爱的人,才会谈恋爱。”但是当对方问你,怎样才算是很爱很爱的时候,你却无法回答他,因为你自己也不知道。
没错,我们总是以为,我们会找到一个自己很爱很爱的人。可是后来,当我们猛然回首,我们才会发觉自己曾经多么天真。假如从来没有开始,你怎么知道自己会不会很爱很爱那个人呢?其实,很爱很爱的感觉,是要在一起经历了许多事情之后才会发现的。或许每个人都希望能够找到自己心目中百分之百的伴侣,但是你有没有想过,在你身边会不会早已经有人默默对你付出很久了,只是你没有发觉而已呢?
所以,还是仔细看看身边的人吧,他或许已经等你很久了。当你爱一个人的时候,爱到八分绝对刚刚好。所有的期待和希望都只有七八分,剩下两三分用来爱自己。如果你还继续爱得更多,很可能会给对方沉重的压力,让彼此喘不过气来,完全丧失了爱情的乐趣。
所以请记住,喝酒不要超过六分醉,吃饭不要超过七分饱,爱一个人不要超过八分。如果你也正在为爱迷惘,或许下面这段话可以给你一些启示:爱一个人,要了解也要开解;要道歉也要道谢;要认错也要改错;要体贴也要体谅;是接受而不是忍受;是宽容而不是纵容;是支持而不是支配;是慰问而不是质问;是倾诉而不是控诉;是难忘而不是遗忘;是彼此交流而不是凡事交代;是为对方默默祈求而不是向对方诸多要求。可以浪漫,但不要浪费,不要随便牵手,更不要随便放手。
浪漫的人这样描述与爱人的相逢:千万人当中,在时间的无涯的荒野里,没有早一步,也没有晚一步,刚巧赶上了。两个人好着的时候,你不妨就这样想吧。如果不好了,你要明白是否和某人在一起,不过是一个再简单不过的概率问题。数千个擦肩而过中,你给谁机会谁就和你有缘分,纵没有甲,也会有乙。别傻等那种想像中的木石前盟般的缘分了,生活中哪有那么多传奇。别醒着做梦了,难道你忘了艺术虽然来源生活,却还高于生活吗?
